It is claimed ( see Section 5 of the entry in the article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(SEP) at the web address given above) that Derrida appropriated the term from Heidegger's use of "destruction' in his work entitled 'Being and Time'. The article then continues that we can get a general sense of what Derrida means with deconstruction by referring to Descartes' First Meditation. In this Descartes states that for a long time he had been making mistakes in his thinking and that in criticising his former beliefs whether valid or mistaken his aim was to uncover a "firm and permanent foundation" on which to build. The writer of the article goes on to say that "the image of a foundation implies that the collection of his [Descartes] former beliefs resembles a building". In searching for the "firm foundation" Descartes is "de-constructing" the structure that had been created from a mix of valid and mistaken beliefs.
The underlying assumption is that there is a 'firm and permanent foundation' to be discovered. It is a reasonable question to ask - how would Descartes know when he had reached the foundation?. What would constitute a 'certainty' i.e. an indisputable belief that could be the concrete upon which he could build his mansion of beliefs? Descartes is probably most famous amongst the general public for the phrase "Cogito ergo Sum" usually translated "I think therefore I am". Here we have someone wondering whether they exist or not or is there a deceiving god who causes them to think they exist. The fact that something is thinking is, in and of itself, proof that something exists to do the thinking - the 'I' in the proposition. However it does not necessarily follow that the 'I' is a human being as we understand that term nor anything that we 'see' in the world around us has the form that we perceive. Nor does it predicate a permanence of a thinking being.
The term is seen as fundamental in Western philosophy because it offers a foundation for all knowledge. Whilst we may be deceived into accepting that other things have an existence separate from our own that we can doubt our existence is proof that we exist. Yet is it sufficient of itself to carry this heavy load? If there is a different 'I' having a different thought can we argue that it is the same 'I' that had another thought but a moment ago even if we feel that there is continuity. Derrida argues that there exists a gap, a miniscule hiatus, that differentiates between the me and myself when I speak to myself - there is a need for me to be both the speaker and the hearer. If I think the thought that I exist because I think, then I will speak that thought to myself to articulate it. Between those two events there will be a miniscule hiatus as I move from speaker to hearer - continuity is broken.
If it is true that 'deconstruction' is adequately defined by Descartes First Meditation and that it is reasonable to believe that Descartes would see as fundamental that 'I' exists because 'I' thinks, then are we not led to the conclusion that 'deconstruction' has no way of knowing when it has reached the foundation i.e it can stop knocking down the building. Does 'deconstruction' require that there is a foundation? All that can be said is that the 'foundation' for Derrida is not a unified self but a divisible limit between myself and myself as an other (auto-affection as hetero-affection: "origin-heterogenous") [SEP ibid]. In the hope that the English translation conveys the meaning of the original French; 'heterogenous' has the meaning 'composed of unrelated or differing parts or elements' [Collins English Dictionary Harper Collins Publishers 1995]. Where to stay the deconstruction would seem to be an arbitrary decision by the deconstructor.
It is said that Derrida was reluctant to give a definition of deconstruction and indeed provided a number throughout his life. In an essay called 'et cetra' published in 2000 Derrida presented that defines deconstruction:
"Each time that I say 'deconstruction and X (regardless of the concept or the theme)' this is the prelude to a very singular division that turns this X into, or rather makes appear this X, an impossibility that becomes its proper and sole possibility, with the result that between the X as possible and the 'same' X as impossible, there is nothing but a relation of homonymy, a relation for which we have to provide an account...' [Deconstructions: a Users Guide, p 300 as given in SEP ibid]. That makes it clear then!!
I had to look up the word 'homonymy' as I had not come across it before. I found it has the meaning " the state or quality of a given word’s having the same spelling and the same sound or pronunciation as another word, but with a different meaning, as race ’tribe’ and race ’running contest.". So the two X's in Derrida's definition have two meanings.
Hanging on to my understanding of deconstruction by my fingernails I am now faced with the task of applying my understanding to a piece of Art. Quite honestly I am not sure what I am supposed to do that is different from Structuralism. At some point in my analysis I will have to stop.
The portrait is of Henry V111th painted in c 1540 possibly by Holbein that can be seen at Trinity College Cambridge. It is chosen because not only there are 'messages' in the elements of the portrait but also a contradiction. It is said that Henry commissioned the portrait (and presumably copies) to demonstrate to his subjects his power and dominance. It has to be remembered that although Henry travelled extensively within his kingdom most of his subjects would have little or any idea of what he looked like.
1 The material of the outer cloak is very rich and is an overt demonstration of the wealth of the King.
2 The bejewelled doublet also emphasises is wealth and position.
3 Hanging round his neck is the Seal of Office the token by which his authority and power is demonstrated. Henry's subjects would have known what the seal meant.
4 The jewelled chain around his neck is indicative of both his position and his wealth.
5 Here his face is serious and possibly threatening in its look. It is that of a powerful man who brooks no argument.
6 Royal Coat of Arms - the dominant positioning of the Arms almost resting on Henry's shoulders is the clear indication of his sovereignty.
7 The dagger clearly expensively made is a symbol of his fighting prowess of which Henry was inordinately proud.
8 Silk clothing. Silk cloth could only be worn legally by a member of the aristocracy and this would be known by all his subjects.
9 His stance - Henry was very proud of his legs and in this painting he shows them to the best advantage. His stance shows a man who 'bestrides' his world.
Through these symbols that most would understand the message is given that here is a man who has the power and wealth that are the rightful trappings of the King. There is no pretence of being 'of the people'. Although most of his subjects lived in poverty he makes no concessions to the fact that much of the poverty was caused by his demands upon the Exchequer.
So Henry portrays himself as the rightful Sovereign. Herein lies the contradiction because he is also the ruler of a democracy albeit one where democratic rights were limited to a very few. He was not the all powerful ruler that the portrait suggests.
Derrida argues [Rogues, p. 100 as quoted in SEP ibid] that democracy and sovereignty are at the same time, but also by turns, inseparable and in contradiction with one another. A Sovereign must wield power and take responsibility for its use by himself. Yet a democracy calls for the sharing of power, for reasons to be given and discussion to take place before a decision is reached. An absolute ruler can make immediate decisions but one that heads a democracy is required to take considered decisions. To end with a quote from Derrida (Rogues p 101) "As soon as I speak to the other, I submit to the law of giving reason(s). I share a virtually universalizable medium, I divide my authority ...... Since [sovereignty] never succeeds [in not sharing] except in critical, precarious, and unstable fashion, sovereignty can only tend, for a limited time to reign without sharing. It can only tend toward imperial hegemony."
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